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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) (Supp. 2001). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
A. ISSUES ON PRINCE, YEATES' APPEAL 
1. Did the evidence and all inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, 
viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict in favor of Mr. Young fail 
to provide any rational basis for the verdict? Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto 
Ins. Co., 2001 UT 89,1 101, 432 Utah Adv. Rep. 44, cert, granted, 122 S. Ct. 
2326 (2002); Geisdorf v. Doughty, 972 P.2d 67, 70 (Utah 1998). 
2. Has Prince, Yeates failed to meet its duty to marshal the evidence by 
focusing only on Mr. Young's claim for breach of contract arising from the 1998-
1999 agreement to provide Mr. Young fair and equitable compensation with 
respect to the helicopter cases, ignoring Mr. Young's claim for breach of contract 
based upon his original contract of employment under which Prince, Yeates was 
to compensate Mr. Young based upon his performance, failing to mention Mr. 
Young's claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
inherent in each of these contracts, and omitting reference to other relevant 
evidence, including evidence bearing on the amount of Mr. Young's 
compensation? Brookside Mobile Home Park v. Peebles, 48 P.3d 968, 975-976 
1 
(Utah 2002); Neelv v. Bennett. 2002 Ut. App. 189. U 11, 51 P.3d 724. 
3. Has Prince, Yeates failed to discharge its duty to marshal the evidence 
supporting the jury's verdict in favor of Mr. Young and to present the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the verdict in providing only selected snippets of 
evidence dealing only with the 1998-1999 direct communications between Mr. 
Young and Prince, Yeates with regard to fair and equitable compensation with 
respect to the helicopter cases without addressing the additional testimony and 
documentary evidence with regard to those discussions and the context of those 
discussions and ignoring other highly relevant and significant evidence? 
Brookside Mobile Home Park v. Peebles. 48 P.2d 968, 976-976 (Utah 2002); 
Neely v. Bennett. 2002 Ut. App. 189, U 11, 51 P.3d 724. 
4. Did the trial court err in granting Mr. Young's motion for summary 
judgment on Prince, Yeates' claim for forfeiture of Mr. Young's compensation 
based upon Mr. Young's alleged breaches of fiduciary duty and in denying Prince, 
Yeates' motion for partial summary judgment on the forfeiture claim on grounds 
that, among other things, Mr. Young, as a mere employee of the Firm, owed no 
fiduciary duty under the controlling Utah case law? Review of a trial court's 
ruling on a motion for summary judgment is for correctness. Surety Underwriters 
v. E & C Trucking. Inc.. 2000 UT 71. f 14, 10 P.3d 338. 
5. Did Prince. Yeates fail to preserve and waive its challenge to the trial 
2 
court's ruling precluding the admission at trial of evidence concerning Mr. 
Young's alleged breaches of fiduciary duty by inviting the ruling excluding such 
evidence, by failing to argue in the trial court that the evidence of Mr. Young's 
alleged breaches of fiduciary duty was relevant to the issues at trial, as it now 
urges for the first time on appeal, and by failing to seek the admission at trial of 
evidence concerning Mr. Young's alleged breaches of fiduciary duty or to proffer 
any such evidence? Brookside Mobile Home Park v. Peebles, 48 P.3d 968, 972 
(Utah 2002); Badger v. Brooklyn Candy Company, 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 
1998). 
B. ISSUES ON MR. YOUNG'S CROSS-APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court err in precluding Mr. Young from submitting his 
claim for attorney fees to the jury and in denying Mr. Young's post-trial motion 
for an award of attorney fees and expenses? "Whether attorney fees are 
recoverable in an action is a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness.'' 
Selvage v. J. J. Johnson & Associates, 910 P.2d 1252, 1257 (Utah App. 1996). 
Mr. Young preserved this issue in the trial court by seeking to submit his claim for 
attorney fees to the jury [R. at 2025. pgs. 194-195 and pgs. 244-254] and by his 
post-trial motion for an award of attorney fees and expenses. [R. at 1807]. 
2. Did the trial court err in denying Mr. Young prejudgment interest? 
Review of a trial court's ruling denying prejudgment interest is for correctness. 
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Cornia v. Wilcox. 898 P.2d 1379, 1387 (Utah 1995); Andreason v. Aetna 
Casualty and Sur. Co.. 848 P.2d 171, 177 (Utah App. 1993). Mr. Young 
preserved this issue in the trial court by seeking prejudgment interest in his 
proposed form of Judgment to which Prince, Yeates objected [R. at 1767]. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Prince, Yeates' appeal and Mr. Young's cross-appeal follow a jury verdict 
and Judgment that Prince, Yeates was in breach of contractual obligations to 
provide Mr. Young fair and equitable compensation, apart from his salary, by 
reason of a contingent fee in the sum of $641,548.38 received as a result of the 
settlement of personal injury claims by Mr. Young's client, Charles Krause, 
arising as a result of a helicopter crash near Grace, Idaho.1 
Following trial, the Court instructed the jury that Mr. Young's claims for 
breach of contract against Prince, Yeates had three aspects: 
1. A claim that Prince, Yeates was obligated under its original oral 
contract of employment with Mr. Young to compensate Mr. Young based upon 
'Mr. Young represented Mr. Krause in Mr. Krause's litigation for personal 
injuries and also represented Mr. Krause's employer, Mountain West Helicopter, 
in litigation by Mountain West for damages to its helicopter. The Krause' 
personal injury case was referred to in the trial court and is referred to in this brief 
as "the Krause fee". Mountain West's litigation for damages to its helicopter was 
referred to in the trial court and will be referred to in this brief as "the Mountain 
West case." The two cases together were referred to and are referred to in this 
brief as "the helicopter cases." 
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his performance. [R. at 1759; Addendum B (Special Verdict Form)]. 
2. A claim that Prince, Yeates was obligated under an additional oral 
contract or a modification of Mr. Young's original contract of employment to 
provide Mr. Young fair and reasonable compensation with respect to any 
contingent fee obtained in the helicopter cases. [Id.]: 
3. A claim that Prince, Yeates breached its implied contractual 
obligation of good faith and fair dealing inherent both in Mr. Young's original 
employment agreement and Prince, Yeates' subsequent agreement for the payment 
of fair and equitable compensation with respect to any fee received in the 
helicopter cases. [R. at 1714-1716 (Jury Instructions on Good Faith & Fair 
Dealing); R. at 1704-1717 (Jury Instructions on Contract Issues); Addendum A 
(Jury Instructions)].2 
The case was submitted to the jury on a Special Verdict which, together 
with the trial court's instructions with regard to the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing, reflected that the jury could return a verdict for Mr. Young if it 
found for Mr. Young on any of the three aspects of Mr. Young's breach of 
contract claims. The questions propounded to the jury, without exception by 
2In the jury instructions conference between the court and counsel for both 
parties, Prince, Yeates' counsel, Mr. Eckersley, conceded "that breach of contract 
is also a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing," [R. at 2025, Pg. 
242] and "if you expressly breach a contract, you would have obviously breached 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing." [R. at 2025, pg. 242]. 
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Prince, Yeates. asked, and the jury's verdict thereon was: 
1. Do you find that Mr. Young was entitled to additional 
compensation as a result of the Krause fee either under his original 
oral employment contract or a valid contract with regard to the 
helicopter cases? 
ANSWER: Yes. 
2. What is the fair and reasonable amount of the fee which 
should be paid to Mr. Young? 
ANSWER: $280,000. 
[R. at 1758-1759; Addendum B (Special Verdict) (emphasis added)]. Following 
return of the Special Verdict, the trial court entered Judgment on the Special 
Verdict. [R. at 1985; Addendum C (Judgment)]. 
Prince, Yeates appeals from the denial of its motion for a directed verdict 
and from the denial of Prince, Yeates' two pretrial motions for summary judgment 
on Mr. Young's claims for breach of contract. Prince, Yeates also appeals from 
the Court's order granting Mr. Young's motion for summary judgment on Prince, 
Yeates' motion for forfeiture of Mr. Young's compensation based upon alleged 
breaches of fiduciary duty by Mr. Young and denying Prince, Yeates' motion for 
partial summary judgment on the same forfeiture claims and from the Court's 
order precluding the admission of evidence at trial concerning Mr. Young's 
alleged breaches of fiduciary duty. 
Mr. Young cross-appeals from the trial court's rulings at trial precluding 
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him from submitting his claim for attorney fees to the jury and denying his post 
trial motion for attorney fees. Mr. Young also cross-appeals the trial court's order 
denying him prejudgment interest. 
A. FACTS RELATING TO PRINCE, YEATES' APPEAL 
1. Mr. Young's Original Employment Agreement 
Mr. Young entered into his original contract of employment with Prince, 
Yeates in 1995. [Prince, Yeates' Opening Brief (hereinafter "Brief) at 2]. The 
terms of Mr. Young's original contract of employment were negotiated 
exclusively between Mr. Young and John Ashton, who at the time was the 
President of Prince, Yeates and functioned as the head of its Litigation group. 
[Brief at 12]. The original contract of employment was an oral contract. [Brief at 
2]. None of the terms of the original contract of employment were ever reduced to 
writing. [Brief at 2; R. at 2026, p. 295]. The testimony of the witnesses was, 
moreover, in agreement as to the terms of Mr. Young's original contract. In 
particular, the testimony was unequivocal that while Mr. Young's initial salary 
was $70,000, his compensation, like that of every lawyer at Prince, Yeates, would 
ultimately be based upon his performance. 
Mr. Young testified in negotiating his original contract of employment, Mr. 
Ashton told Mr. Young his compensation would be based upon performance: 
Q. And was that salary or compensation to be subject to 
adjustment? 
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A. Yes. 
Q Upon what, if anything? 
A. Well the salary that has been discussed, in my mind, was 
never a guaranteed salary. I understood that I was employed at will 
that I could quit at any time, that they could terminate me at any 
time. And that salary was subject to adjustment up or down, 
depending on my performance. In other words, if I didn't justify 
my salary by the revenue that I brought in, it would be reduced or I 
would be terminated. 
If I more than justified my salary, it would be increased or I 
would leave the firm and take my work with me where I felt like I 
could make more money. 
[R. at 2026 pp. 293-94 (emphasis supplied)]. 
On cross examination, Mr. Ashton admitted he told Mr. Young that Mr. 
Young's compensation would be increased if warranted by his performance: 
Q You remember that he was going to be an associate, true? 
A Yes. 
Q And there was discussion about his salary. 
A Yes. 
Q And the amount of his salary. 
A Yes. 
Q And there was discussion about performance. 
A Yes. 
Q And you indicated to Mr. Young that the firm would 
measure his performance, correct. 
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A Yes. 
Q And you indicated to Mr. Young that his 
compensation would be affected by his performance. 
A After the first year, yes. 
Q In other words, if Mr. Young proved himself, if he did 
well, if he attained good results, he could expect to make more 
money. 
A I think that's generally accurate. 
[R. at 2025 p. 173 (emphasis added)]. 
John Chindlund, Prince, Yeates' President and its representative at trial, 
testified Mr. Young's employment, like that of other Prince*, Yeates' lawyers, was 
subject to adjustment based on performance: 
Q Lawyer compensation at Prince Yeates during the 
period that Mr. Young worked there was based on 
performance, wasn't it? 
A Let me answer that this way. In a very general sense, 
ultimately, I guess you'd say, compensation for all of us at the 
firm has to do with performance. 
Q But in general, if a lawyer at the firm could expect 
that, as his performance improved in terms of dollars, that his 
compensation would go up. 
A That would be a general - that would generally be 
accurate. 
[R. at 2025. pgs. 83-85 (emphasis added)]. 
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Mr. Ashton told Mr. Young he would be considered for partnership in two 
to three years, based upon his performance. [R. at 2025, pg. 174]. 
Significantly, though Prince, Yeates arguments that Mr. Young had no 
contractual right to additional compensation with respect to the Krause fee 
proceed upon the assertion and assumption that Mr. Young's compensation was 
limited to his salary, the record is utterly devoid of any evidence that it was ever 
part of Mr. Young's employment agreement that Mr. Young's compensation was 
limited to his salary. The evidence is to the contrary: Mr. Young was to be 
compensated based upon his performance. Indeed, there was never even any 
requirement that Mr. Young assign his clients or work to the Firm - the cases that 
Mr. Young brought in were his cases.3 
3At trial, Mr. Young testified: 
I believed that I had an interest in the [Krause] case from the outset of 
my employment, based on the terms of my employment and the fact it was 
my case that I brought to the firm and I was doing all the work on it. 
[R. at 2026, pgs. 375-376]. Mr. Young also testified: 
Q In connection with your hiring at Prince Yeates. was there 
any agreement on your part to give up or assign to Prince Yeates the 
work that you might bring in to the firm? 
A There was never any discussion about whether I was 
expected to give up my work to the firm in exchange for the salary. 
And that has been, perhaps, the single most aggravating thing to me 
about this dispute. My work was valuable to me, thank you, and 
Prince Yeates has suggested in this dispute that, in return for a 
$70,000 salary, I agreed to give up all of my work to them. That 
was never discussed. I was never asked to do that, and I would 
never have agreed to do that. It was more important to me to have 
my work than it was to have the salary that Prince Yeates had 
10 
Prince, Yeates* opening brief makes only passing reference to Mr. Young's 
claim for breach of contract based upon his original contract of employment, 
mischaracterizing the claim not as a cause of action alleged by Mr. Young and 
submitted for determination by the jury, but as merely something that Mr. 
Young's "counsel argued to the jury. . . ." [Brief at 12]. Additionally, Prince, 
Yeates* opening brief wholly fails to marshal the evidence with regard to Mr. 
Young's claim for breach of his original contract of employment, omits reference 
to significant facts supporting Mr. Young's claim for breach of his original 
contract of employment, and fails to present the evidence in the light most 
favorable to Mr. Young. Among other failures and omissions, Prince, Yeates' 
opening brief fails and omits to state or reflect that: 
1. At the time he was hired by Prince, Yeates, Mr. Young had been 
engaged in the practice of law for almost 12 years, most of that time as General 
Counsel for Rocky Mountain Helicopter, where he had acquired extensive 
experience in helicopter litigation. [R. at 2026, pgs. 284-286]. 
offered me. 
[R. at 2026, pg. 296]. Mr. Ashton's testimony at trial confirmed this: 
Q You didn't have any discussions with Mr. Young before 
he joined the firm in terms of who, as between the firm and Mr. 
Young, would own the cases that Mr. Young brought to the firm, 
did you? 
A I don't think I had any specific discussions about that. no. 
[R. at 2025. pg. 174]. 
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2. Though Prince, Yeates employed Mr. Young as an associate, Mr. 
Young, as a lateral hire with substantial prior experience in the practice of law. 
functioned in a position different from that of other associates. [R. at 2026. pgs. 
294-295J.4 
3. Mr. Young was solely responsible for obtaining the helicopter cases. 
[R. at 2025, pg. 72; 2026, pg. 306]. Apart from attorneys at the Texas firm which 
was also involved in the representation, Mr. Young performed all of the work on 
the helicopter cases - no Prince, Yeates attorney, other than Mr. Young, 
performed any work on the cases. [Exs. 33-34]. 
4. Mr. Young undertook the representation of Mr. Krause and Mountain 
West expecting to be compensated for a successful result in the cases over and 
above his salary. Mr. Young understood the Firm based compensation upon 
performance. Additionally, he expected to become a shareholder three years after 
his hiring in 1995, before the cases were concluded. 
5. Records supplied by Prince, Yeates in discovery, attested to by Mr. 
Chindlund at trial, established that during Mr. Young's time at Prince, Yeates, he 
collected $1,086,296 in fees (including the Krause fee). [R. at 2025, pg. 76-78]. 
4It is undisputed that at the time of the initial discussions regarding Mr. 
Young's potential employment at Prince, Yeates, Mr. Young informed Prince. 
Yeates it made no difference to him whether wchis position in a firm is as an 
associate or in an of counsel capacity.'' [Ex. 4]. 
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6. With one exception, the $1,086,296 in fees attributable to Mr. Young 
is the largest amount collected by any lawyer as a result of that lawyer's work in 
the period that Mr. Young worked for the Firm. The only lawyer who collected 
more was John Heaton, a senior shareholder. Mr. Heaton's salary was more than 
double that paid to Mr. Young. [R. at 2025. pgs. 77-78]. 
7. Even excluding Krause. Prince, Yeates* records reveal Mr. Young 
collected fees of $444,748 - substantially more than the $307,190 he received in 
salary and benefits. [R. at 2025, pg. 77]. 
8. Mr. Young, in fact, received substantially less in salary and benefits 
during the period of his employment with the Firm than any shareholder of the 
Firm. [Ex. 22. pg. 2]. 
9. If the Court accepts Prince, Yeates" arguments, the Firm will receive 
the entire Krause fee of $641,548.38. to which it contributed little, if anything, 
and Mr. Young, whose collections were second highest in the Finn, will be paid 
less than any shareholder of the Finn and than virtually any other lawyer. 
10. The Krause fee, moreover, is extraordinary. It is the largest 
contingent fee in the history of the Firm.5 [R. at 2025, pg. 75]. 
5Prince. Yeates' opening brief asserts that Carl Barton, a former Prince, 
Yeates attorney and Mr. Young's neighbor who introduced Mr. Young to the 
Firm, "testified he told Mr. Young that [Mr. Young's] compensation would be 
limited to his salary and would not include any amount for contingent fee 
recoveries/'1 [Brief at 2-3]. Prince. Yeates" brief fails, however, to provide any 
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2. The Later Agreement With Regard To Any Fee Received In 
Connection With The Helicopter Cases. 
Mr. Young's negotiations with Prince, Yeates, with regard to any fee 
received in the helicopter cases, occurred in 1998 and the first half of 1999. 
By October 1998, Mr. Young, having been passed over for partner in 1997 
and denied salary increases, wanted assurance that he would receive recognition 
and a substantial portion of the fee in the helicopter cases if he remained with the 
Firm and was successful in securing a recovery. By October 1998, the Firm, for 
its part, considered Mr. Young's future with the Firm to be uncertain. In a 
memorandum dated August 18, 1998, Mr. Barton and the Firm's Associates' 
Committee concluded: 
No one thought Rob was ready to become a shareholder at 
this time. The focus of almost all of the evaluations was an 
economic one: are we making money on Rob? If so, let's not 
send him away and have another empty office. 
record citation for such testimony. Mr. Young denied having any such 
conversation with Mr. Barton. [R. at 2026, p. 292]. Additionally, it is undisputed 
that Mr. Barton was not involved in the negotiations of Mr. Young's original 
contract of employment with Prince, Yeates - Mr. Young's original contract of 
employment was negotiated between Mr. Young and Mr. Ashton. [Brief at 12]. 
Prince, Yeates' assertion that Mr. Ashton testified there was no discussion 
in the negotiations leading to Mr. Young's employment with the Firm that Mr. 
Young's "compensation would be made up of anything other than his salary" is 
misleading. [ Brief at 14]. Mr. Ashton testified that Mr. Young's compensation 
was subject to adjustment based upon performance. [R. at 2025, p. 173]. Mr. 
Young secured the contingency fee representation of Mr. Krause and of Mountain 
West in the helicopter cases in 1996 [Brief at 3] after he had entered into his 
original contract of employment with the Firm. 
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[Ex. 11 at pg. 2 (emphasis added)]. 
Following a meeting of the Firm's Board of Directors on August 195 1998. 
the Board formally took over, from the Associates' Committee, the evaluation of 
Mr. Young's status with the Firm. [Ex. 11 at pg. 2]. Some of the members of the 
Firm's Board of Directors thought Mr. Young's collections were too low and that 
Mr. Young should be immediately asked to leave the Firm. 
On August 19, 1998, the Board asked Mr. Barton and Roger McConkie to 
meet with Mr. Young "to determine why his accounts receivable and work in 
process are so high." [Ex. 12 at pg. 2].6 
On September 24, 1998, the Board asked Mr. Barton and Mr. McConkie to 
meet with Mr. Young regarding the helicopter cases. On that same day, Mr. 
Barton and Mr. McConkie met with Mr. Young. Mr. Young explained his 
collections were down and his work in progress numbers were high because he 
was working the helicopter cases. Mr. Young also asked how he would be 
compensated out of any fee received if he was successful in the cases. [Ex. 12 at 
pg. 2; Ex. 13atpg. 1]. 
The Board's attitude concerning Mr. Young changed dramatically upon the 
6Remarkably, some members of the Board of Directors mistakenly thought 
the helicopter cases were hourly fee rather than contingent fee cases or that the 
cases had been changed from hourly fee to contingent fee cases, contributing to 
the perception that Mr. Young's collections were low. [Ex. 12 at pg. 2]. 
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receipt of Mr. Eckersley *s evaluation that the helicopter cases were potentially 
very lucrative cases. The Board now recognized the helicopter cases presented the 
prospect for the receipt of contingent fees far exceeding any fee the Firm had 
previously obtained and which would only be realized if Mr. Young were induced 
to stay. [Ex.16, pgs. 1-2; Ex. 17, pgs. 2-3]. 
Stipulated facts read to the jury during the trial attest that Mr. Eckersley 
had a conversation with Mr. Young at this time which suggested to Mr. Eckersley 
that Mr. Young was discouraged and might leave the Firm, taking the helicopter 
cases with him. [R. at 2026, pg. 283]. Mr. Eckersley believes he related his 
conversation with Mr. Young to Mr. Ashton. [Id-]-
Knowing Mr. Young wanted assurance he would be fairly compensated out 
of any recovery if he were to stay, the Board charged Mr. Ashton and the Firm's 
then President, Mr. Chindlund to meet with Mr. Young and to arrive at an 
agreement. [Ex. 17, pg. 3]. Board minutes for November 17, 1998 state the 
Associates Committee recommended Mr. Young be paid a portion of any 
recovery. 
The Committee realizes these cases will "make or break" Mr. 
Young and it is the suggestion of the Associates Committee that 
the Board consider whether a portion of any recovery should be 
paid to Mr. Young as a bonus. 
[Ex. 17 at pg. 2 (emphasis added)]. 
Between December of 1998 and May of 1999, Mr. Ashton and Mr. 
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Chindlund engaged in a series of meetings with Mr. Young regarding the 
compensation Mr. Young would receive out of any recovery in the helicopter 
cases. [R. at 2025, pgs. 17-19; 2026, pgs. 310-311]. 
The Board minutes of February 17, 1999 reflect that at least by that date, 
Mr. Ashton and Mr. Chindlund were operating under directions from the Board 
"to get the negotiating settled with Mr. Young and move on once and for all." 
[Ex. 21 at pg. 2 (emphasis added)]. 
Mr. Young testified that through his meetings with Mr. Ashton and Mr. 
Chindlund, he reached an oral agreement with Prince, Yeates that he was to be 
paid a fair and equitable sum out of any recovery in the helicopter cases and that 
the agreement was not conditioned upon further agreement as to the dollar 
amount. 
Q You mentioned fair and equitable compensation. Let 
me ask you about that. Was there a discussion about that in this 
meeting? 
A Well, in virtually every meeting we had, Mr. 
Chindlund or Mr. Ashton or me would make a comment along 
the lines that we expect to be fair about this. They suggested, 
"We expect to be fair with you, Mr. Young, in coming to an 
understanding as to what is fair and equitable compensation." 
I suggested I expected to be fair with them in contributing a 
fee I was generating to the firm. And that, from my perspective, we 
had an understanding from the outset that we were going to be 
fair and equitable about this, that I was going to be fairly 
compensated and that what remained to be resolved was what 
represented fair compensation. 
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[R. at 2026 pp. 312-13 (emphasis added)]. 
Consistent with Mr. Young's testimony and claim that Prince, Yeates had 
agreed Mr. Young would be compensated based upon his performance, Mr. 
Chindlund testified with regard to the agreement that Mr. Young was to receive 
fair and equitable compensation with respect to any fee received in the helicopter 
cases. Initially, however, Mr. Chindlund did so only after the Court sustained two 
objections to the compound nature of the question asked by his counsel, Mr. 
Eckersley, which had obviously been designed to elicit a different response: 
Q At any time in the meetings, did you or Mr. Ashton, in 
your presence, indicate to Mr. Young that the firm promised to pay 
him a fair and equitable share of any proportion of the - excuse me 
- of any fee recovered and that if in fact you could not determine 
between yourselves what that amount was. you would allow that to 
be determined by some third party? 
Mr. Gaufin: Objection. The question is compound. 
The Court: Reframe the question. 
Q (By Mr. Eckersley) At any time in any of the meetings 
that you had with Mr. Young, did you or Mr. Ashton, in your 
presence, promise Mr. Young that he would be paid a fair and 
equitable portion of any fee recovered in the helicopter cases and 
that if you could not agree to a fee - that is, you, Mr. Young and Mr. 
Ashton - that you'd allow a third party to determine that? 
Mr. Gaufin: Sam objection. If s compound. 
The Court: Sustained. 
Q (By Mr. Eckersley) At any time, in the meetings that 
you had with Mr. Young, did you or Mr. Ashton, in your 
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presence, promise Mr. Young that he would receive a fair and 
equitable portion of the fee? 
A We told Rob that the firm wanted to treat him fairly. 
[R. at 2025, pp. 60-61 (emphasis added)]. 
Mr. Chindlund's testimony, on cross-examination, provides even more 
explicit confirmation of Mr. Young's testimony: 
Q Now, if I understood you correctly, you just testified 
that you had told Mr. Young, in your negotiations with him, 
that the firm wanted to be fair in terms of compensating Mr. 
Young with regard to [a] successful outcome in the cases. 
That's true, isn't it? 
A Yes. 
Q And when you told him that, did you mean it? 
A Yes. 
Q You indicated that you were [reluctant] to characterize 
what you said to Mr. Young as a promise. 
A Yes. 
Q But you - you told him that the firm wanted to be fair 
with him and would be fair with him, and you wanted him to 
believe it, didn't you? 
A Yes. 
Q And you meant it. 
A Yes. 
[R. at 2025, pg. 64]. Mr. Chindlund further testified: 
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Q It's true, isn't it, that when you were meeting with Mr. 
Young, you and Mr. Ashton wanted to be - wanted to provide 
Mr. Young with fair and equitable compensation, if there were 
recoveries in the helicopter cases? 
A Wanted to reward Rob, if his efforts resulted in a good 
recovery for the firm. And I guess, when I say good, what I'm 
talking about is a recovery over and above what the firm had 
invested in the case. 
Q And you wanted to do that and you told Mr. Young 
that you wanted to do that, isn't that true? 
A Yes. Yes. 
Q And it's correct, isn't it, that, in your meetings, you 
told Mr. Young that the firm intended to fairly and equitably 
compensate Mr. Young if the result that you described was 
achieved. It's true, isn't it? 
A Yes. 
[R. at 2025, p. 91 (emphasis added)]. 
John Ashton testified similarly about the meeting with Mr. Young. 
Q Did you tell Mr. Young that it was your desire to 
provide him with a fair amount out of the fees? 
A Probably something like that. I think what we said 
was we wanted to be reasonable and we wanted to try to pay 
him some amount that would be reasonable, if we could reach 
some sort of an agreement. 
[R. at 2025, pg. 179 (emphasis added)]. 
Mr. Young testified Mr. Ashton told him he could expect to become a 
partner in the Firm if he was successful in obtaining a recovery. [R. at 2026, pg. 
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319]. Mr. Ashton's testimony at trial confirmed the subject of Mr. Young's 
becoming a partner was, in fact, discussed. [R. at 2025. pg. 180]. 
Mr. Young testified Mr. Chindlund told Mr. Young he should be careful 
not to "poison the well" by requesting too much of the Firm and if he did not 
"poison the well" the Firm "would take care of hinf'when Mr. Young's work 
"subsided" temporarily after completion of the cases. [R. at 2026, pgs. 318-319]. 
Mr. Chindlund's testimony at trial confirmed Mr. Young's testimony.7 
Ultimately, Mr. Ashton, Mr. Chindlund. and Mr. Young reached a basic 
understanding that any recovery would go first to reimburse the Firm for Mr. 
Young's time and what Mr. Ashton and Mr. Chindlund had asserted to be Mr. 
Young's "collection deficit" with the remainder of the fee to be divided 1/3 to Mr. 
Young and 2/3 to the Firm. [Ex. 24; R. at 2026, pg. 317].8 
7Mr. Chindlund testified that: 
Q And in terms of poisoning the well, those were your 
terms. 
A That was my phrase. 
[R. at pgs. 99-100 (emphasis supplied)]. 
8In the course of their meetings, Mr. Chindlund and Mr. Ashton, for 
example, convinced Mr. Young that he had a "collection deficit" of $318,000 to 
the Firm which Mr. Young was required to pay back. The claimed "collection 
deficit" was the reason for Mr. Young's willingness to permit deduction of the 
amounts logged as fees in the two cases. 
Mr. Young was not aware of it at the time, but learned through discovery 
and demonstrated at trial, that he had no collection deficit to the Firm and that Mr. 
Chindlund's claim of supposed collection deficit was based upon Firm 
expectations, not on the actual performance of other attorneys. Mr. Young also 
learned through discovery and demonstrated at trial that his collections were on 
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The Board minutes of April 28. 1999 reflect that Mr. Chindlund advised 
the Board that Mr. Young was "amenable*' to a 1/2 - 2/3 split. [Ex. 23 at pg. 2].9 
Mr. Chindlund obtained the Board's authority and on May 5, 1999 wrote a 
memorandum to Mr. Young documenting the 1/3 - 2/3 agreement. Mr. 
Chindlund's memorandum stated that he sought to confirm in writing the 
"understanding" existing between Mr. Young and the Firm. The memorandum 
also states he was conveying "the Board's proposal that John Ashton and I 
previously discussed with you, regarding the division of any recovery in 
the . . . cases." [Ex. 24 (emphasis added)]. 
Before sending his May 5, 1999 memorandum, Mr. Chindlund also met 
with the shareholders to discuss "the Firm's proposed fee splitting arrangements 
with [Mr. Young]." [Ex. 70 at pg. 2 (emphasis added)].10 
Mr. Young did not sign the May 5, 1999 memorandum because it omitted 
par even with those of shareholders, who collected only slightly more than Mr. 
Young, but were paid considerably more. In fact, documents produced by Prince, 
Yeates in discovery and admitted in evidence at trial disclose that the Firm was 
aware, but did not inform Mr. Young, that Mr. Young had, over the period of his 
employment through March of 1999, made fully $80,000 less than the average 
made by the four lowest compensated shareholders. [Ex. 22 at 2]. 
9Mr. Young had requested a 50% split and agreed to the 1/3 - 2/3 split 
following a "poisoning the well" discussion described below. Prince, Yeates 
agreed a 1/3 - 2/3 split did not "poison the well." [R. at 2026, pgs. 323-324]. 
10Mr. Barton prepared the May 3, 1999 minutes and chose the words "fee 
splitting arrangements/' [Ex. 70 at pg. 2 (emphasis added)]. 
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reference to Mr. Ashton's statement that Mr. Young could expect to become a 
partner and Mr. Chindlund's statement that the Firm would "take care of Mr. 
Young" if Mr. Young "did not poison the well." Mr. Young agreed, however, to 
the 1/3 - 2/3 split, at least if adjustments were made relative to the amount to be 
deducted for time logged to the cases and if the Firm acknowledged the 
commitments made by Mr. Ashton and Mr. Chindlund. 
Until July 7, 1999, Prince, Yeates, Mr. Ashton and Mr. Chindlund had 
never asserted that Mr. Young was not entitled to a fair and equitable portion of 
any recover)7 in the helicopter cases. To the contrary, Mr. Ashton and Mr. 
Chindlund had always stated that Mr. Young should receive a fair and equitable 
portion of any recovery in the cases. As Mr. Chindlund testified: 
Q And neither you or Mr. Ashton ever told Mr. Young the 
contrary. You never told Mr. Young that the firm would not 
compensate him if the successful result was achieved in the cases 
during your meetings with him, did you? 
A Let me answer that this way: Never told him that, but in 
the context of having told him, there wasn't a legal obligation, as I 
think I explained in my earlier testimony. But the answer to your 
question is: Right, we didn't tell him we didn't want to treat him 
fair and equitably. 
Q Never did. 
A That's correct. 
[R. at 2025, p. 92]. 
Mr. Young's discussions with Mr. Chindlund and Mr. Ashton regarding 
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the 1/3 - 2/3 division did not stand alone, but were made in the context of Mr. 
Ashton's statement that Mr. Young could expect to become a partner if he were 
successful in the cases and Mr. Chindlund's statement that the Firm would "take 
care of him" if he did not "poison the well" and other representations by the Firm. 
Mr. Young would not have agreed to the 1/3 - 2/3 split but for these commitments 
and representations. [R. at 2026, pgs. 318-319, 323-324]. 
Prince. Yeates' opening brief focuses only on Mr. Young's claim for 
breach of contract arising out of Prince, Yeates' 1998-1999 agreement to provide 
Mr. Young fair and equitable compensation with respect to the helicopter cases, 
ignoring Mr. Young's additional claim for breach of contract based upon his 
original contract of employment for performance-based compensation. 
Additionally, Prince, Yeates' opening brief wholly fails to marshal the evidence 
with regard to Mr. Young's claim for breach of his contract for fair and equitable 
compensation with regard to any fee received in the helicopter cases, omitting 
reference to other highly relevant evidence, and fails to present the evidence in the 
light most favorable to Mr. Young. Among other failures and omissions, Prince, 
Yeates' opening brief fails and omits to state or reflect that: 
1. Mr. Chindlund's and Mr. Ashton's negotiations with Mr. Young were 
not precatory or illusory, but occurred at the express direction of the Board, over a 
period of several months, and were for the purpose of inducing Mr. Young to 
24 
remain with the Firm in order that the Firm would be assured of participating in 
any recoveries received in the cases. 
2. Mr. Chindlund's and Mr. Ashton's negotiations with Mr. Young 
included specific statements that Mr. Young could expect to be made a partner if 
he was successful in obtaining a recovery in the helicopter cases and statements 
that Mr. Young should be careful "not to poison the well" in order "that the Firm 
would take care of him." [R. at 2026, pgs. 318-319]. 
3. Mr. Young was justified in believing that Mr. Chindlund's letter of 
May 5, 1999 [Ex. 24] incorrectly failed to include important elements of the 
parties' agreement with regard to fair and equitable compensation agreed to by 
Mr. Ashton and Mr. Chindlund. 
3. Prince, Yeates' Breach Of The Implied Covenant Of Good Faith 
And Fair Dealing 
Prince, Yeates' opening brief fails even to refer to the facts regarding 
Prince, Yeates" breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, let 
alone to marshal the evidence regarding Mr. Young's claim for breach of the 
implied covenant or to present that evidence in the light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict. Prince, Yeates' purpose in these failures and omissions, obviously, 
is to falsely suggest that Mr. Young made excessive and unwarranted demands, 
ultimately leading to Mr. Young's supposedly voluntary termination of his 
employment with the Firm. The evidence and testimony is to the contrary. 
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On June 23, 1999, Mr. Young met with the Firm's Board to go over his 
June 15, 1999 memorandum and Mr. Chindlund's memorandum of May 5, 1999. 
The minutes of the June 23, 1999 Board meeting reflect Cwan agreement in 
principal" was reached on the 1/3 - 2/3 split, including two adjustments Mr. 
Young had requested. [Ex. 28, pg. 2]. Mr. Young was informed at that meeting 
that the Board would not and could not promise he would be made a shareholder 
as the shareholders, not the Board, were required to vote to make an attorney a 
shareholder. From Mr. Young's standpoint, at least, the issue of whether a 
shareholder would so vote was left for future determination. [Ex. 36; R. at 771-
775]. 
On Thursday and Friday, June 10-11, 1999. after a substantial period of 
litigation and discovery, a mediation was held in Dallas, Texas with respect to the 
litigation brought on behalf of Mr. Krause, resulting in an agreement on the 
principal terms of a settlement. Mr. Young did not attend the mediation and 
learned of the agreement to settle on Monday, June 14, 1999. The settlement was 
later finalized by the execution of settlement documents in August 1999. The 
settlement proceeds were payable in August 1999 and were distributed in 
September 1999. [R. at 2026, pgs. 337-338]. 
Mr. Young did not immediately inform the Board of the tentative 
agreement to settle because he perceived the Firm was back pedaling on its prior 
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commitments to him and was concerned the Firm would not proceed in good faith 
to perform its agreements with him if it knew a mediation settlement had been 
reached. [R. at 2026, pgs. 338-340]. The evidence at trial amply demonstrated 
that Mr. Young's concerns were well founded. 
The Firm's shareholders met on June 30, 1999. As in the case of the 
minutes for the prior May 3, 1999 shareholders" meeting, Mr. Barton prepared the 
minutes of the June 30, 1999 shareholders' meeting and those minutes, as initially 
prepared, reflect that Mr. Chindlund reported to the shareholders on the "fee 
splitting arrangement which Rob and the Board have been discussing and 
negotiating."11 [Ex. 76, pg. 3 (emphasis added)]. 
In the course of Mr. Young's discussions with the Firm relative to the two 
cases, the need to advance funds to the Texas firm to balance expenses was 
nThe original version of the June 30, 1999 shareholder meeting minutes 
read, in pertinent part, "John Chindlund also gave a status report about recent 
meetings with Rob Young and the fee splitting arrangement Rob and the 
Board have been discussing and negotiating." [Ex. 76 (emphasis supplied)]. 
Six weeks later, on the day after the Firm filed its Complaint and under the 
signature of Mr. Barton, the minutes were altered to read "John Chindlund also 
gave a status report about recent meetings with Rob Young and the potential 
bonus arrangement Rob and the Board have been discussing/' [Ex. 75 
(emphasis supplied)]. The obvious inference, supported by the evidence, is that 
the Firm saw a distinction between a "fee splitting arrangement*' Prince, Yeates 
was "discussing and negotiating"' with Mr. Young and a mere "potential bonus*' 
that the Firm was only "discussing" with him. The alteration of the June 30, 1999 
minutes, to say only a "bonus" was "discussed," presumably took care of the 
concerns arising out of that distinction. The Firm provided no reasonable 
explanation for the change. [Ex. 76, pg. 3; 75, pg. 2]. 
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repeatedly emphasized. On June 23. 1999, Richard Blanck, the newly elected 
President of the Firm, even advised the Board of Directors of the Firm and Mr. 
Young that in a recent discussion with Helen Shiflar, an office manager at the 
Firm, he had learned that Prince. Yeates had an understanding with the Texas firm 
to pay those expenses in installments. [R. at 2026. pg, 342]. 
Mr. Young subsequently learned there was, in fact, no arrangement with 
the Texas firm to equalize expenses by payments in installments and that the 
imbalance in expenses was causing the Texas firm to reconsider its agreement to 
an equal distribution of the fee with regard to Mr. Krause. [Ex. 74]. Mr. Young, 
therefore, personally advanced to the Texas firm payment for expenses in the sum 
of $35,000. [R. at 2026. pg. 334]. 
The relationship between Mr. Young and the Firm rapidly deteriorated in 
July 1999. Mr. Young wrote a memorandum to the Board on July 2. 1999 in 
which he complained the Firm had not acted to fulfill its commitments to him, 
stated the Krause case was going to settle resulting in a fee of about $650,000, and 
further stating "I will leave the Firm effective July 16, 1999, if we are unable to 
agree on an equitable distribution of the fee, and my status and future here.'" 
[Ex. 29 (emphasis added)]. 
Mr. Young met with the Board on July 7, 1999. By that time, the Board, 
however, had learned of the mediation settlement of the Krause case independent 
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of Mr. Young's July 2, 1999 memorandum, had convened another shareholders 
meeting, obtained a vote that Mr. Young would not be made a shareholder [Ex. 
30], and prepared a memorandum to Mr. Young which it delivered at the end of 
the meeting. [Ex.31]. 
The Board's July 7, 1999 memorandum claimed, for the first time, that 
Mr. Young had no entitlement to any portion of the recovery in the helicopter 
cases, but offered to grant Mr. Young a "bonus" of $50,000. [Ex. 31]. Mr. 
Young rejected that proposal as dishonest and insulting. The Board's 
memorandum accepted Mr. Young's resignation effective July 16, 1999. [Ex. 
31]. 
Mr. Young asserts and the evidence at trial demonstrated, that after 
learning of the mediation settlement and of the amount of the settlement, the Firm 
seized what it saw as an opportunity to keep the fee for itself and to exclude Mr. 
Young from participating in the fee which he had, among other things, been 
promised. Mr. Ashton's testimony at trial was impeached by his prior deposition 
testimony, which plainly reveals the truth in Mr. Young's assertion that the Firm 
seized upon what it saw as an opportunity to exclude Mr. Young from the 
compensation which he was due: 
Q But let me call your attention to page 173 of your 
deposition. And to the testimony beginning at line 16. 
A Yes. 
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Q And my question to you will be: Were you asked these 
questions and did you give these answers? 
A Yes. 
Q "Question: Can I ask you something realistically? Did 
the firm ever or anybody in it ever get offended with Mr. Young 
prior to the time that they knew that there was a $600,000 fee for the 
firm? 
"Answer: I don't know. Well, I say that may be the case. We 
clearly, in the exchange of correspondence in June, set a number of 
people strongly against Mr. Young. 
"Question: Did anybody get strongly against Mr. Young 
before they knew how much money they were going to get with 
regard to the contingency fee in the Krause case? 
"Answer: I don't know. I would not be surprised at all if 
that were the case/' 
Were you asked those questions and did you give those 
answers? 
A I did. 
Q Was it the truth? 
A Yes. 
[R.at2025,pgs. 184-185]. 
The Firm's abrupt termination of Mr. Young's employment prevented Mr. 
Young from finalizing with the Firm the dollar amount that would fairly and 
equitably compensate him with regard to the recovery in the helicopter case and 
resulted in Mr. Young's leaving the Firm with no final agreement on the actual 
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dollar amount of the compensation to be paid with regard to the Krause fee. 
Further, because Prince, Yeates had not paid its portion of the expenses to the 
Texas firm, Mr. Young himself paid those expenses. [R. at 2026, pg. 334]. 
Instead of receiving a fair and equitable portion of the $641,548.38 fee and 
remaining at Prince, Yeates as a shareholder with the Firm's commitment to "take 
care of him". Mr. Young was not only unexpectedly forced out the door and 
forced, without opportunity for advance preparation, into private practice, but was 
also saddled with the continued representation of Mountain West in the Mountain 
West case, without any support from Prince, Yeates.12 
B. FACTS RELATING TO MR. YOUNG'S CROSS-APPEAL 
1. Mr. Young's Claim For Attorney Fees And Expenses 
During closing argument, Prince, Yeates' counsel, Mr. Eckersley, 
acknowledged that, in the discussions and negotiations wherein Prince, Yeates 
and Mr. Young unsuccessfully sought agreement on an amount that represented 
Mr. Young's fair and equitable portion of the fee (in the context of the statements 
made by Mr. Ashton and Mr. Chindlund that, if Mr. Young were successful, he 
12In the Mountain West case. Judge Kimball granted summary judgment 
against Mountain West, under the so-called "purely economic loss doctrine." Mr. 
Young appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Tenth Circuit 
affirmed in an unreported decision and Mr. Young petitioned the United States 
Supreme Court for a Writ of Certiorari. The United States Supreme Court denied 
the petition. [R. at 2026, pgs. 353-354]. 
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could expect to become a partner and that Prince, Yeates would take care of him 
after the helicopter cases ended). Mr. Young never asked for more than $204,500. 
[R. at 2027, pg. 440]. Moreover, even after it became apparent, by July 15, 1999. 
that Prince Yeates would not honor the commitments Mr. Young testified that the 
firm made to him as part of the discussions and negotiations, Mr. Young asked for 
only $250,000 as his fair and equitable portion of the Krause fee. [R. at 1932]. 
Ultimately, after enduring litigation first initiated by Prince, Yeates in 
August 1999, including the Firm's three motions for summary judgment, a 
petition for interlocutory appeal a motion for directed verdict, trial and now this 
appeal, all intended to deprive Mr. Young of any portion of the fee, the jury 
awarded Mr. Young $280,000 — $30,000 more than he claimed, at the outset, as 
his fair and equitable compensation. The award comes, however, after years of 
intransigence by Prince, Yeates , the reasonably foreseeable consequence of which 
was to substantially dilute Mr. Young's victory by leaving Mr. Young to pay his 
own attorneys' fees from the amount the jury awarded him as his fair and 
reasonable portion of the fee. If Prince, Yeates had, in good faith, divided the fee, 
in September 1999, by giving Mr. Young what he then, in good faith, claimed, 
i.e., $30,000 less than the jury awarded, Mr. Young would have received 
$250,000 with no attorneys' fee obligation. For these reasons, Mr. Young 
asserted a claim for attorneys' fees under Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 
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840 (Utah 1992). Mr. Young sought an award for attorneys' fees and expenses 
totaling $396,245.59. [R. at 1842]. The trial court denied Mr. Young's claim for 
attorney fees and expenses, reasoning that Mr. Young's attorney fees were not 
recoverable under the rationale of Heslop. [R. at 1985, pg. 3; Addendum C]. 
2. Mr. Young's Claim For Prejudgment Interest. 
Mr. Young's claim to recover fair and reasonable compensation with 
respect to the helicopter cases was presented and quantified for the jury through 
the presentation of extensive facts and figures, including, but not limited to, 
evidence regarding the amount of the fees generated by Mr. Young, the amount of 
Mr. Young's salary in relation to that of other Firm attorneys, and the amount of 
Mr. Young's compensation in relation to that of other Firm attorneys with similar 
billings and collections. The trial court, nonetheless, denied Mr. Young's claim 
for prejudgment interest reasoning Mr. Young's claim for additional 
compensation was "unliquidated." [R. at 1985, pg. 3; Addendum C, pg. 3]. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE JURY'S SPECIAL VERDICT IN FAVOR OF MR. YOUNG ON 
HIS CLAIMS FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT AGAINST PRINCE, 
YEATES IS AMPLY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND 
REQUIRES THAT THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT ON THE 
JURY VERDICT BE AFFIRMED 
Though Prince, Yeates' Opening Brief focuses on only a single claim for 
breach of contract - Mr. Young's claim for breach of Prince, Yeates' agreement to 
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pay him fair and reasonable compensation with respect to any recoveries in the 
helicopter cases - Mr. Young, in fact, alleged and the trial court properly 
instructed the jury that Mr. Young's claims for breach of contract had three 
separate, but complimentary aspects, each of which independently warranted a 
finding that Prince, Yeates breached its contractual obligations to Mr. Young. 
The evidence presented to the jury viewed, as it must be. in the light most 
favorable to the jury's Special Verdict, amply supports the jury's verdict, 
requiring that the trial court's Judgment on the verdict be affirmed. Campbell v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 2001 UT 89, H 101, 432 Utah Adv. Rep. 44 
(citation omitted), cert, granted, 122 S. Ct. 2326 (2002); Geisdorf v. Doughty, 972 
P.2d 67, 70 (Utah 1998) ("[when examining jury verdicts such as these, 'we 
review the evidence and all inferences which may be reasonably drawn from it in 
the light most favorable to the verdict,"' and reverse the lower court only when 
'we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict'.") (citations 
omitted).13 
13The fact Mr. Young's claims for breach of contract are sanctioned by the 
evidence and verdict requires the conclusion that Prince, Yeates' pre-trial motion 
for summary judgment on Mr. Young's claims were properly denied. 
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A. The Jury's Special Verdict And The Trial Court's Judgment 
Thereon Are Amply Supported By The Evidence With Regard To 
Mr. Young's Claim For Breach Of Contract Based Upon Mr. 
Young's Original Contract Of Employment 
The evidence presented to the jury on Mr. Young's claim for breach of 
contract arising from Mr. Young's original contract of employment, viewed in the 
light most favorable to the jury's Special Verdict, amply supports the jury's 
verdict. The jury could well have concluded from the evidence that Mr. Young's 
compensation was subject to increase based upon Mr. Young's performance and 
that Mr. Young's performance in securing the Krause fee, together with his other 
collections, warranted the payment of fair and reasonable additional compensation 
to Mr. Young. 
Mr. Young's original contract of employment was a contract for services. 
It is well-established that, in the case of contracts for services, where the dollar 
amount of compensation is subject to adjustment or otherwise not fixed 
exclusively at a set amount, the law implies that compensation in a "reasonable" 
amount is intended. Professor Corbin's treatise correctly states the rule: 
An agreement to pay a "fair price" for . . . services may be 
regarded as identical with a promise to pay a "reasonable price." If 
such is the accepted meaning, the agreement is sufficiently definite 
for enforcement. It is obvious that a contract to pay a reasonable 
price, or reasonable compensation for services, leaves plenty of 
opportunity for difference of opinion and dispute. It can not 
properly be assumed that only one price or wage is reasonable under 
the particular circumstances of any case. Reasonableness is a matter 
of opinion, and opinions differ, even though they are equally honest 
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and well informed. A promise to pay a reasonable priee or wages 
is, in its legal effect, a promise to pay a sum that a court or jury 
may determine in case of dispute . . . . 
How much is reasonable in any particular case is a question 
of fact, not one of law. 
Corbin on Contracts § 4.5 at 595 (Vol. 1, 1993) (emphasis added); see also 
Varnev v. Ditmars. 111 N.E. 822, 823-824 (N.Y. App. 1916) (cited in Prince, 
Yeates' Opening Brief at pgs. 25-26). 
The Utah Court of Appeals adopted the law as stated by Professor Corbin 
in its decision in The Republic Group, Inc. v. Won-Door Corp., 883 P.2d 285 
(Utah App. 1994). Won-Door involved an oral contract for payment of a 
"reasonable" fee by Won-Door in connection with Republic's securing of funding 
for Won-Door through a private placement. Won-Door moved for summary 
judgment on the precise grounds that Prince, Yeates urges the trial court erred in 
rejecting here and obtained summary judgment in the trial court.14 On appeal the 
Utah Court of Appeals reversed, allowing Republic to proceed to trial because 
"[h]ere, the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to Republic, could 
support a finding that a "reasonable" fee is what the parties actually agreed to, and 
that the exact dollar amount would be settled in the future." Won-Door. 883 P.2d 
14
 Won-Door argued "the evidence provided by Republic only indicates that 
the parties agreed a 'reasonable fee' would be paid" and "[tjhere was never an 
agreement definitely as to what the fee agreement was." Won-Door, 883 P.2d at 
290. 
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at 291.1:> 
Prince, Yeates' legal arguments, moreover, are all answered by the fact the 
jury was properly instructed with instructions which Prince, Yeates does not 
challenge in this appeal. The trial court correctly instructed the jury, without 
exception by Prince, Yeates, that Mr. Young's original oral contract of 
employment was a valid express contract, and the jury's task with respect to the 
original contract of employment was simply to find the terms of that contract. [R. 
at 1712]. 
15
 Compare Gagne v. Vaccaro, No. 950372611, 1997 Conn. Super. LEXIS 
936 (Conn. Super. Ct., April 7, 1997) (denying motion for summary judgment on 
claim by former attorney against successor attorney for breach of contract for 
reasonable and fair compensation out of the settlement of a personal injury case); 
Foster v. Young, 156 P. 476 (Cal. 1916) (upholding judgment for attorney on 
contract for payment of "reasonable" compensation); Pillois v. Billingsley, 179 
F.2d 205 (2d Cir. 1950) (upholding judgment for breach of a promise to pay a 
"reasonable" fee for procuring a contract); Hogan v. Wright 356 F.2d 595, 597-
98 (6th Cir. 1966) ("Recovery has been allowed . . . where the facts disclose that 
this was the intention of the parties or where . . . the payment to be made shall be 
'reasonable1,, 'fair', 'right', or 'good'. . . . No arbitrary formula can be applied. The 
facts of each case must be considered to determine the intentions of the parties."); 
G. H. McShane Co., Inc. v. McFadden. 414 F. Supp. 720, 726-27 (W. D. Pa. 
1976)(same); Corbin on Contracts § 4.3 at 572 (1993) ("At times the agreement is 
explicit that a reasonable price will be agreed upon. In such a case, all should 
agree that the agreement is sufficiently definite."). 
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B. The Jury's Special Verdict And The Trial Court's Judgment 
Thereon Are Amply Supported By The Evidence With Regard To 
Mr. Young's Claim For Breach Of Contract Based Upon Prince, 
Yeates' Agreement To Pay Mr. Young Fair And Equitable 
Compensation With Respect To The Helicopter Cases 
The evidence presented to the jury on Mr. Young's claim for breach of 
contract based upon Prince, Yeates' agreement to pay Mr. Young fair and 
equitable compensation with respect to the helicopter cases, viewed in the light 
most favorable to the jury's Special Verdict, also amply supports the jury's 
verdict. The jury could well have concluded that Prince, Yeates entered into a 
valid, binding agreement to pay Mr. Young fair and equitable additional 
compensation in order to induce Mr. Young to remain at the Firm, that the 
contract to pay fair and equitable compensation was not conditioned upon 
agreement with regard to the amount of such additional compensation, and that 
Prince, Yeates' made binding commitments notwithstanding its protestations that 
the statements made by Mr. Chindlund and Mr. Ashton in their negotiations with 
Mr. Young were simply "illusory", "indefinite", or "statements of mere intention", 
subject to withdrawal or change of mind. 
Again, Prince, Yeates' legal arguments are all answered by the fact that the 
jury was properly instructed, which Prince, Yeates does not challenge in this 
appeal, or on the ground that Prince, Yeates' legal arguments, to the extent that 
they are not embodied in the trial court's instructions, misstate the law. The trial 
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court correctly instructed the jury that the jury had to find that Prince, Yeates 
made a definite offer and that Mr. Young accepted the offer through his 
statements or conduct in order to find that Mr. Young had a valid contract for the 
payment of fair and equitable compensation with respect to the helicopter cases. 
[R. at 1706-1707; Addendum A (Jury Instructions)]. The trial court correctly 
instructed the jury that mere statements of intention or illusory promises were 
inadequate to establish the existence of an offer. [R. at 1706; Addendum A (Jury 
Instructions)]. The trial court even instructed the jury, over Mr. Young's 
objection, as to the provisions of the Restatement of Agency applicable in the 
absence of an enforceable agreement. [R. at 1710; Addendum A (Jury 
Instructions)]. The jury, having considered these instructions, could well have 
determined to reject Prince, Yeates' view of the evidence and to adopt Mr. 
Young's view of the evidence. 
Again, the Utah Court of Appeals' decision in The Republic Group, Inc. v. 
Won-Door Corp.. 883 P.2d 285 (Utah App. 1994) is instructive. In Won-Door, 
the Utah Court of Appeals, in holding that Republic was entitled to proceed to 
trial on its claim that it had an express oral contract for the payment of 
"reasonable" compensation, explicitly rejected Prince, Yeates1 arguments that an 
express oral contract for the payment of reasonable compensation is void or 
unenforceable for failure of a meeting of the minds, for indefiniteness and 
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uncertainty, or as an agreement to agree.16 
C. Mr. Young's Claim For Breach Of The Implied Covenant Of 
Good Faith And Fair Dealing 
The jury's Special Verdict is amply supported by the evidence with regard 
to Mr. Young's claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing - a claim which Prince, Yeates in its opening brief simply ignores. 
In Brown v. Weis, 871 P.2d 552 (Utah App. 1994), the Utah Court of 
Appeals recognized that if parties to a contract agree to "reasonable 
compensation" and the party bound to make payment subsequently refuses to 
make any detemiination as to the amount thereof, then, under the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing, the party entitled to receive payment is entitled to 
reasonable compensation "as determined by a court." 
The purpose of the covenant [of good faith and fair dealing] is to 
require that "the duties and rights created by the contract should be 
,6Indeed, Professor Corbin notes that once Mr. Young had performed and 
generated the fee, Prince, Yeates was contractually bound to pay "fair" 
compensation either pursuant to an express contract or. if the agreement was too 
indefinite for enforcement, then in quasi contract: 
"After . . . services [have been] actually rendered, the defendant is 
bound to make reasonable compensation therefor, whether the 
agreement under which the benefit was conferred was too indefinite 
for enforcement or not. It then becomes unnecessary to determine 
whether the defendant in reality promised to pay a reasonable price. 
If the promise was made, the court is enforcing the express promise. 
If the promise was not made, the duty to pay is described as quasi-
contractual, but it is identical in result." 
Corbin on Contracts §4.5 at 595-596 (Vol. 1, 1993). 
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performed and exercised in good faith." Brehany v. Nordstrom, 
Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 55 (Utah 1991). The Restatement provides the 
following example of the covenant: If A contracts to perform 
services for B for such compensation "as you, in your sole 
judgment, may decide is reasonable" and B subsequently 
refuses to make any determination, A is entitled to the value of 
the services as determined by a court. Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 205 cmt. d, illus. 6 (1979). 
Brown v. Weis, 871 P.2d at 564, n. 18 (emphasis supplied). If, as the jury may 
well have concluded, the parties agreed Mr. Young should receive "fair" or 
"reasonable" compensation, in addition to salary, based upon his performance or 
for a successful result in the Krause case, then upon successfully concluding the 
case, the covenant of good faith and fair dealing permits Mr. Young to recover 
"fair" or "reasonable" compensation, as determined by the court, even if Prince, 
Yeates' refuses to agree on the amount of that fair compensation.17 
D. The Jury's Special Verdict And The Trial Court's Judgment 
Based Thereon Should Be Summarily Affirmed Due To Prince, 
Yeates' Failure To Marshal The Evidence And To Present The 
Evidence In The Light Most Favorable To The Verdict 
Prince, Yeates' appeal should be summarily denied on the ground that 
,7Likewise, in Won-Door the Utah Court of Appeals held that "[t]he Utah 
Supreme Court has held f[t]he fact that part of the performance is that the parties 
will enter into a contract in the future does not render the original agreement any 
less binding.' Bunnell v. Bills. 13 Utah 2d 83, 87, 368 P.2d 597, 600 (Utah 1962) 
(quoted in Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs.. 752 P.2d 892, 897 (Utah 1988))." 
Won-Door, 883 P.2d at 291, n. 5. Thus, the fact that Prince, Yeates and Mr. 
Young had agreed to enter into a contract as to the fair amount of Mr. Young's 
compensation did not render any less binding the original agreement to fairly 
compensate Mr. Young from the Krause fee. 
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Prince, Yeates has utterly ignored its obligation to marshal the evidence and to 
present the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Brookside Mobile 
Home Park v. Peebles. 48 P.3d 968. 975-976 (Utah 2002); Neely v. Bennett. 2002 
Ut.App. 189, H 11, 51 P.3d 724. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING PRINCE, 
YEATES' JUNE 2001 MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT OR IN GRANTING MR. YOUNG'S AUGUST 2001 
CROSS-MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The shocking reality of Prince, Yeates1 position on appeal with regard to its 
forfeiture claim is that Mr. Young, who, during the term of his relationship with 
Prince, Yeates, generated approximately $1,100,000 in fees for which he was paid 
approximately $300,000 in salary ($580,000 including the jury award), "breached 
his duty of loyalty to his employer" [ Brief at 30], breached his "fiduciary duty" 
[Id. at 33], engaged in "dishonesty" and "embezzle[d] money". [Id. at 34]. In 
sum, Mr. Young was a "disloyal employee" and a "faithless agent" [Id- at 36], as 
well as an "unfaithful servant". [Id. at 39]. 
The fundamental flaw in Prince, Yeates' breach of fiduciary duty argument 
is that unless Mr. Young was in a "fiduciary relationship" with Prince, Yeates, he 
cannot be held to the fiduciary duty Prince, Yeates claims he breached. 
Remarkably Prince, Yeates' Brief does not cite (much less attempt to distinguish) 
the Utah cases in point or even one of the dozens of cases on which Mr. Young 
relied to persuade the trial court that, as a mere employee, he had no fiduciary duty 
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requiring him to surrender to Prince. Yeates the work or the fees it complains of. 
[Compare Prince, Yeates^ Brief at pgs. 29-40 with R. at 1184-1232; 1382-1417]. 
Under Utah law, mere employees such as Mr. Young are not 
fiduciaries. Microbiological Research Corp. v. Muna. 625 P.2d 690, 695 (Utah 
1981); Renshaw v. Tracy Loan & Trust Co.. 49 P.2d 403; 405 (Utah 1935). In 
Microbiological Research Corp., an employer claimed its employee violated a 
fiduciary duty to disclose material information, and the trial court agreed. On 
appeal this Court reversed because, while the employee had once been president 
of the employer, by the time of his omission he had been demoted (while retaining 
his employee status) to a mere consultant, researcher and lab director. 
The trial court ruled that [the employee] had violated his 
fiduciary duty to [the employer] by his failure to reveal [material 
information] during . . . negotiations. . . . These negotiations 
occurred after [the employeej's removal as a managing officer. 
When a corporate officer ceases to act as such, because of his 
resignation or removal, the fiduciary relationship ceases. 
Microbiological Research Corp.. 625 P.2d at 695 (emphasis added); see also 
Renshaw. 49 P.2d at 405 (rejecting contention that a mere employee is a fiduciary 
of his employer because, among other things, "Plaintiff has cited no authority to 
support such contention and we have been unable to find any."). 
Utah's Court of Appeals has reached the same conclusion. In C&Y 
Corporation v. General Biometrics. Inc.. 896 P.2d 47 (Utah App. 1995). an 
employer sued some of its directors for misappropriating a corporate opportunity. 
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One of the directors defended on the ground that at the time of his alleged 
disloyalty, he was no longer acting as a director, and therefore owed no duty to 
surrender the opportunity to his employer. The Utah Court of Appeals agreed, 
applying the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Microbiological Research Corp v. 
Muna, that '"when a corporate officer [or director] ceases to act as such . . . the 
fiduciary relationship ceases.'" Id. at 54-55, quoting Microbiological Research 
Corp.,625P.2dat695.18 
18
 See also DSC Communications v. Next Level Communications, 107 F.3d 
322, 326-27 (5th Cir. 1997) (employees had no duty not to compete with employer 
because "the usurpation of corporate opportunity doctrine isJnapplicable to 
any[one] . . . who is not also an officer, director, or major shareholder of a 
corporate entity."); UTAIC v. MacKeen & Bailey Inc.. 99 F.3d 645, 651 (5lh Cir. 
1996) (actuary had no duty to surrender corporate opportunities to insurance 
company because he was not an officer, director, or major shareholder to 
company); Delta Environmental Prods., Inc. v. McGrew, 56 F. Supp. 2d 716, 718-
19 (S.D. Miss. 1999) (because employer "failed to plead any allegation which 
would support a claim . . . that [employees] were 'officers,'. . . these [employees] 
are not subject to the doctrine of usurpation of corporate opportunities."); Walter 
E. Zemitzsch, Inc. v. Harrison, 712 S.W.2d 418, 422 (Mo.App. 1986) (employee 
who was an officer with limited authority and not a director or shareholder was 
not a fiduciary and therefore owed employer no duty not to compete); Modern 
Materials v. Advanced Tooling, 557 N.W.2d 835, 839 (Wis.App. 1996) 
(employee was under no duty not to compete with employer because such duty is 
fiduciary in nature, and as a non-managerial employee, employee did not owe 
fiduciary duties to employer); J Bar H, Inc. v. Johnson, 822 P.2d 849, 861-62 
(Wyo. 1991) (employee who was an officer and director of employer in name only 
could directly compete with employer because "she was not allowed any 
meaningful participation in the management of the corporation" and thus "was 
under no obligation not to compete when she formed her business."); Pruitt v. 
United Chester Industries, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 5767, *8 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) 
("Texas does not generally recognize a fiduciary duty between employers and 
employees."); Odorizzi v. Bloomfield School District, 54 Cal. Rptr. 533, 539 (Cal. 
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If there were the least bit of merit to the breach of fiduciary duty claim, the 
remedy of forfeiture is such a drastic remedy that it is reserved for serious and 
material breaches. "The undesirability of [forfeiture] is well-stated by the legal 
maxim that 'the law abhors forfeiture."' Madsen v. Anderson, 667 P.2d 44, 47 
(Utah 1983); Commercial Investment Corp. v. Siggard, 936 P.2d 1105, 1109 
(Utah App. 1997) (same). Hence, the Restatement indicates forfeiture of an 
agent's compensation is available only if the agent's breach is "a material breach of 
duty." Restatement (Second) of Agency § 456 cmt. a (1958). This is consistent 
with the notion that a breach of contract excuses the non-breaching party's 
performance only if the breach is "material," i.e., only if it is a breach that "defeats 
the very object of the contract." Polyglycoat Corp. v. Holcomb, 591 P.2d 449. 
451 (Utah 1979) (citation omitted); Holbrook v. Master Protection Corp., 883 
P.2d 295, 301 (Utah App. 1994). 
Here, Prince, Yeates complains that "Mr. Young performed work for the 
Charlesworth's [sic] for which he was ultimately paid $8,665.25. . . ." [Brief at 6]. 
What Prince, Yeates does not explain is that, of the $8,665.25 Prince, Yeates 
App. 1966) ("Under prevailing judicial opinion no presumption of a confidential 
[or fiduciary] relationship arises from the bare fact that parties to a contract are 
employer and employee"); White v. Ransmeier & Spellman, 950 F. Supp. 39, 43 
(D.N.H. 1996) ("The [employer's] claim, which seeks recovery for acts of an at-
will, nonmanagerial employee, falls outside the scope of [accepted] conception^] 
of the duty of loyalty, and beyond the scope of any cause of action for breach of 
the duty of loyalty."). 
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complains of. Mr. Young was "ultimately" paid $6,509.99 of that amount in 
October 1999, i.e., three months after Mr. Young's relationship with the Firm 
ended. Moreover, Prince, Yeates does not explain that when Mr. Young first 
commenced work at the Finn, he brought with him several contingent fee cases 
that he was already working on. Under the same rationale Prince, Yeates used, in 
the trial court, to argue entitlement to the $6,509.99 Mr. Young received in 
October 1999, Mr. Young argued entitlement to the sum of $20,857.33 paid 
entirely to Prince, Yeates for work done before Mr. Young ever joined the Firm! 
The trial court properly determined not to trouble the jury with this trivia19 in the 
context of a dispute arising over the "fair" division of a $640,000 fee. 
III. PRINCE, YEATES FAILED TO PRESERVE AND WAIVED ITS 
CHALLENGE TO THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING PRECLUDING 
THE ADMISSION AT TRIAL OF EVIDENCE OF MR. YOUNG'S 
ALLEGED BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY 
Prince, Yeates failed to preserve and waived its challenge to the trial 
court's ruling precluding the admission at trial of evidence of Mr. Young's 
alleged breach of fiduciary duty. Prince, Yeates invited the trial court's ruling 
precluding the admission at trial of evidence concerning Mr. Young's alleged 
breaches of fiduciary duty. Prince, Yeates failed to argue in the trial court that the 
19Judge Bohling referred to these matters as "those little diddley . . . cases" 
and those "de minimis matters that were just sort of handled on a personal basis." 
[R. at 2025, pg. 233]. 
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evidence of Mr. Young's alleged breaches of fiduciary duty was relevant to the 
issues at trial with regard to Mr. Young's claims, as it now urges for the first time 
on appeal. Additionally, Prince, Yeates failed to seek the admission at trial of 
evidence concerning Mr. Young's alleged breaches of fiduciary duty or even to 
proffer any such evidence. Brookside Mobile Home-Park v. Peebles. 48 P.3d 968, 
972 (Utah 2002); Badger v. Brooklyn Candy Company, 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 
1998). 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING MR. YOUNG HIS 
REASONABLE ATTORNEYS' FEES INCURRED AS 
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES FOR PRINCE, YEATES' BREACH 
OF CONTRACT 
In Heslopv. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828 (Utah 1992), the Court held: 
The rationale for allowing attorney fees as recoverable damages 
within the contemplation of the parties in first party insurer 
claims is also applicable to employment claims.20 
839 P.2d at 840 (emphasis added). In Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co.. 918 
P.2d 461, 468 n.4 (Utah 1996), this Court noted that Heslop had extended its 
cases calling for the recovery of attorney fees in first party insurance disputes to 
employment contract disputes. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals' decision in 
20This Court's decisions with regard to the recovery of attorney fees in first 
party insurance disputes include Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange. 701 P.2d 
795 (Utah 1985). Zions First Nat'l Bank v. National Am. Title Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 
651 (Utah 1988) and Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989), 
and Billings v. Union Banker's Insurance Co.. 918 P.2d 461 (Utah 1996). 
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Pugh v. North American Warranty Services, Inc., 1 P.3d 570 (Utah App. 2000), 
relying on Zions, extends this first-party insurance contract rationale to a claim for 
breach of contract for failure to repair a vehicle under a service contract, reasoning 
that: 
The policy concerns that led the Utah Supreme Court to allow for 
recovery of attorney fees [in breach of first-party insurance contract 
cases] applies with equal vigor to North American's breach of the 
service contract in this case. Pugh's vehicle was stranded in Cedar 
City for an entire year due to North American's refusal to pay for the 
necessary repairs. North American's actions resulted in foreseeable 
and provable consequential damages to Pugh, including the attorney 
fees he had to incur in an ultimately successful effort to recover his 
due. See Zions, 749 P.2d at 657 
1 P.3d at 575 (Utah App. 2000). 
The rationale of this Court's decisions in Heslop and Billings and the Court 
of Appeals decision in Pugh, plainly afford Mr. Young a claim for the recovery of 
attorneys' fees in this employment case. The trial court erred in denying Mr. 
Young's claim for attorney fees. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING MR. YOUNG 
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 15-1-1 
The trial court erred in denying Mr. Young prejudgment interest under 
Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1 on the basis that Mr. Young's claims for breach of 
contract were "unliquidated". This Court's Cornia v. Wilcox, 898 P.2d 1379 
(Utah 1995) decision recognizes "[t]he law on this [prejudgment interest] issue is 
clear" and the right to prejudgment interest depends upon whether the damages 
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are measurable "by facts and figures" and not by whether the underlying claim for 
damages is "unliquidated'*. 
[W]here the damage is complete and the amount of the loss is 
fixed as of a particular time, and that loss can be measured by 
facts and figures, interest should be allowed from that time . . . 
and not from the date of judgment. On the other hand, where 
damages are incomplete or cannot be calculated with mathematical 
accuracy, such as in the case of personal injury, wrongful death, 
defamation of character, false imprisonment, etc., the amount of the 
damages must be ascertained and assessed by the trier of the fact at 
the trial, and in such cases prejudgment interest is not allowed. 
898 P.2d at 1387 (emphasis added). Mr. Young's claims for damages for breach 
of contract were unquestionably fixed at the date of receipt of the Krause fee in 
September 1999 and were measurable "by facts and figures", entitling Mr. Young 
to prejudgment interest.21 
2,The irony of the trial court's denial of prejudgment interest arises from the 
fact the parties, in the trial court, stipulated to deposit the $641,548.38 fee in an 
interest bearing account pending resolution of the dispute. R. at 6-9. At the time 
of submitting this brief, that account has generated nearly $90,000 in interest. The 
jury awarded Mr. Young $280,000 or approximately 44% of the fee as his "fair" 
portion. Hence, although 44% of the accrued interest is attributable to Mr. 
Young's "fair" portion of the fee, the Court's prejudgment interest ruling gives 
Prince, Yeates 100% of that interest! "The purpose of a prejudgment interest 
award is to compensate a plaintiff for actual loss or to prevent a defendant's 
unjust enrichment." Canyon Country Store v. Bracey. 781 P.2d 414, 422 (Utah 
1989) (emphasis supplied). Here, the trial court's ruling allows Prince, Yeates to 
collect interest not only on its share of the funds held in escrow, but also on Mr. 
Young's share! Such a ruling, without question, unjustly enriches Prince. Yeates 
at the expense of Mr. Young, who is the prevailing party! 
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CONCLUSION 
Consistent with the foregoing law and argument, Mr. Young seeks this 
Court's Order AFFIRMING (1) the jury's Special Verdict and the trial court's 
Judgment thereon and (2) the trial court's orders (a) denying Prince, Yeates' 
motions for summary and partial summary judgment and for a directed verdict and 
(b) granting Mr. Young's motion for partial summary judgment. In addition, Mr. 
Young seeks the Court's Order REVERSING the trial court's orders denying Mr. 
Young a Prejudgment Interest Award and his reasonable attorneys' fees incurred 
as consequential damages and REMANDING to the trial court for determination 
of the amount of prejudgment interest and attorneys' fees to which Mr. Young is 
entitled. 
DATED: October ll , 2002. 
BERMAN, GAUFIN, TOMSIC & SAVAGE 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801) 328-2200 
Attorneys for Defendant, Counterclaim Plaintiff, Appellee 
and Cross-Appellant Robert S. Young 
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ADDENDUM 
A. Jury Instructions 
B. Special Verdict 
C. Judgment 
Tab A 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOBim mmm coos? 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, Thlrd JudiC(al District 
S T A T E O F U T A H NOV 3 0 2001 
^SALT^AKE^UNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
PRINCE, YEATES & 
GELDZAHLER, a professional 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
ROBERT S. YOUNG, 
Defendant 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
CASE NO: 990908360 
THE JURY IS HEREBY CHARGED WITH THE LAW THAT APPLIES 
TO THIS CASE IN THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS, NUMBERED (I) 
THROUGH (3^), INCLUSIVE. 
Dated this 3 6 day of November . 2001. 
COURT: 
WILLIAM B. BOHLING 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
'fS t 
CP.CVI 
INSTRUCTION NO. _A 
Members of the jury, I would like to thank you for your attention during 
this trial. I will now explain to you the rules of law that you must follow and 
apply in deciding this case. When I have finished you will go to the jury room 
and begin your discussions, what we call your deliberations. Please pay 
attention to the legal instructions I am about to give you. This is an extremely 
important part of this trial. 
You are not to single out one instruction alone as stating the law, but 
must consider the instructions as a whole. The order in which the instructions 
are given has no significance as to their relative importance. If a direction or 
an idea is stated more than once, or in varying ways, no emphasis is intended 
and none must be inferred by you. 
l.CVI 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3-
It is my duty to instruct you in the law that applies to this case, and it 
is your duty, as jurors to follow the law as I state it to you, regardless of what 
you personally believe the law is or ought to be. Even if you do not like the 
laws that must be applied, you must use them. On the other hand, it is your 
exclusive duty to determine the facts in this case, and to consider and weigh 
the evidence for that purpose. Your responsibility must be exercised with 
sincere judgment, sound discretion and honest deliberation. 
2-CVI 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1 
This case must not be decided for or against anyone because you feel 
sorry for anyone or angry at anyone. It is your sworn duty to decide this case 
based on the facts and the law, without regard to sympathy, passion or 
prejudice. 
3.CV1 
* - /*o 
INSTRUCTION NO. H 
This case must be decided only upon the evidence which you have heard 
from the witnesses, and have seen in the form of documents, photographs or other 
tangible things admitted into evidence. 
Anything you may have seen or heard from any other source may not be 
considered by you in arriving at your verdict. 
You should not consider as evidence any statement of the lawyers made 
during trial, except that stipulations read by the lawyers are evidence as I 
instructed you when the stipulations were read. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 5 
Remember, the lawyers trying this case are not on trial. Your feelings about 
them should not influence your decision in this case. The lawyers are here to 
represent the best interests of their clients. It is the duty of the lawyer on each side 
of a case to object when the other side offers evidence which the lawyer believes 
is not admissible. You should not speculate as to the reasons for the objections, 
nor should you allow yourself to become angry at a party because a partyf s lawyer 
has made objections. 
5.CVI 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ 
The fact that the plaintiff is a corporation and the defendant is an 
individual, should make no difference whatever to you. It is your duty to hear and 
determine this case the same as if it were between individuals. You should look 
solely to the evidence for the facts and to the instructions I give you for the law, 
and return a true and just verdict according to the facts established by the 
evidence and the law as I have stated it to you. 
INSTRUCTION NO. T. 
A fact may be proved by circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial 
evidence consists of facts or circumstances that give rise to a reasonable 
inference of the truth of the facts sought to be proved. 
7.CVI 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ 
In the present action, certain testimony has been read to you by way of 
deposition. You are not to discount this testimony for the sole reason that it 
comes to you in the form of a deposition. It is entitled to the same 
consideration as if the witness had personally appeared. 
8.CVI 
INSTRUCTION NO. <J 
Where there is a conflict in the evidence you should reconcile such 
conflict as far as you reasonably can. But where the conflict cannot be 
reconciled, you are the final judges and must determine from the evidence 
what the facts are. There are no definite rules governing how you shall 
determine the weight or convincing force of any evidence, or how you shall 
determine what the facts in this case are. But you should carefully and 
conscientiously consider and compare all of the testimony, and all of the facts 
and circumstances, which have a bearing on any issue, and determine 
therefrom what the facts are. You are not bound to believe all that the 
witnesses have testified to or any witness or class of witnesses unless such 
testimony is reasonable and convincing in view of all of the facts and 
circumstances in evidence. You may believe one witness as against many, or 
many as against a fewer number in accordance with your honest convictions. 
The testimony of a witness known to have made false statements on one matter 
is naturally less convincing on other matters. So if you believe a witness has 
wilfully testified falsely as to any material fact in this case, you may disregard 
the whole of the testimony of such witness, or you may give it such weight as 
you think it is entitled to. 
U.CVI 
INSTRUCTION NO. ID 
You are the exclusive judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the 
weight of the evidence. In judging the weight of the testimony and credibility 
of the witnesses you have a right to take into consideration their bias, their 
interest in the result of the suit, or any probable motive or lack thereof to 
testify fairly, if any is shown. You may consider the witnesses' deportment 
upon the witness stand, the reasonableness of their statements, their apparent 
frankness or candor, or the want of it, their opportunity to know, their ability 
to understand, and their capacity to remember. You should consider these 
matters together with all of the other facts and circumstances which you may 
believe have a bearing on the truthfulness or accuracy of the witnesses' 
statement. 
12.CVI 
INSTRUCTION NO. \\ 
Whenever in these instructions it is stated that the burden of proof rests 
upon a certain party, or that a party must prove a certain proposition, or that 
you must find a certain proposition to be true, I mean that unless the truth 
of the allegation is proved by a preponderance of the evidence, you shall find 
that the same is not true. 
13.CVI 
INSTRUCTION NO. \*L 
The term "preponderance of the evidence" means that evidence which, 
in your minds, seems to be of the greater weight; the most convincing and 
satisfactory. The preponderance of the evidence is not determined by the 
number of witnesses, nor the amount of the testimony, but by the convincing 
character of the testimony, weighed impartially, fairly and honestly by you. If 
the evidence is evenly balanced as to its convincing force on any allegation, you 
must find that such allegation has not been proved. 
14.CVI 
INSTRUCTION NO. _ v 3 
Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler has the burden of proof in this case to establish 
that Robert Young was an employee of the firm when the fee in the Krause case 
was earned, that Mr. Young was entitled to receive salary and benefits and no 
other compensation, and that the fee was earned while Mr. Young was acting 
within the scope of his employment Mr. Young bears the burden of proof on the 
basis of the existence of any contract regarding his entitlement to a portion of the 
Krause fee. 
4.CVI 
INSTRUCTION NO. J_+ 
A contract is an agreement. 
A contract may be either express or implied from the facts and 
circumstances. 
A contract may be written or oral. 
A contract may consist of several documents, verbal agreements, or both. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
A valid express contract exists where: 
1. One party made an offer to the other party; 
2. The party to whom the offer was made accepted the offer; and 
3. Each party gave something in return for what that party received. 
INSTRUCTION NO. _Ji_ 
An offer is a definite proposal to enter into a specific contract upon 
acceptance by the person receiving the offer. A mere expression of intention or 
general willingness to do something on the happening of a particular event or in 
return for something to be received does not amount to an offer. 
INSTRUCTION NO. jJ7_ 
A valid express contract exists if: 
1. Prince Yeates or Mr. Young communicated an offer to the other; and 
2. Prince Yeates or Mr. Young accepted the offer and communicated 
the acceptance of the offer. 
Unless a particular mode of acceptance is specified by the offer, the 
acceptance does not need to be express or formal. Acceptance may be shown by 
writing, words, or conduct that indicates agreement to the offer. However, an 
offer must be accepted in its entirety. An offer cannot be accepted in part and 
rejected in part. 
INSTRUCTION NO. I& 
Further, the terms of a contract may be express or implied. A contract may 
contain both express and implied terms. In express terms, the parties reach their 
agreement by spoken or written words. In implied terms, the agreement is implied from 
the parties' acts and conduct. Implied terms may also be shown by custom and usage. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 15 
Whether negotiations with regard to compensation for services result in the 
formation of an express contract depends upon the parties reaching an agreement. 
If the parties are merely negotiating the terms of a possible future agreement 
without intending or expecting to be bound, no contract has been formed. On the 
other hand, if the parties agree and intend to be bound to pay reasonable 
compensation, a contract may be found to exist even though the dollar amount of 
compensation remains to be determined. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2D 
Unless otherwise agreed in the original employment contract or a valid 
modification of the contract, an employee who makes a profit in connection with 
a transaction conducted by him on behalf of his employer is under a duty to give 
such profit to his employer. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2\ 
An agent has a right to retain possession of money where he has gained 
possession in the proper execution of his agency, until he is paid the amount due him 
from the principal as compensation for services performed. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2. JL 
You are instructed that Mr. Young's oral employment agreement with Prince 
Yeates is a valid express contract. Your task with regard to Mr. Young's oral 
employment agreement with Prince Yeates is to determine the terms of the contract. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ 3 
You are instructed that Mr. Young was not employed for any definite 
period of time and was therefore free at any time to leave Prince Yeates' 
employment Further, if Mr. Young left Prince Yeates' employment, his clients 
would be free to choose whether he would continue to handle legal matters which 
he handled at the Firm. Accordingly, if you find that Prince Yeates offered Mr. 
Young additional compensation in order to induce him to remain at the Firm, you 
may find that Mr Young's conduct in remaining at the Firm constituted 
acceptance, and the giving of something in return to the Firm. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2 4 
Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing 
with respect to the dealings between the parties. The parties to a contract must deal fairly 
and honestly with each other. Nevertheless, this duty of good faith and fair dealing does 
not create any implied obligation contradictory to the express provisions of the contract. 
Also, the duty of good faith and fair dealing does not mean that a party is obligated to 
exercise any of the party's contract rights to the party's own detriment for the purpose of 
benefitting another party to the contract. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ ^ 
Under the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, each party impliedly promises 
that he will not intentionally or purposely do anything which will destroy or injure the 
other party's right to receive the fruits of the contract. 
To comply with this obligation to perform a contract in good faith, a party's 
actions must be consistent with the agreed common purpose and the justified 
expectations of the other party. 
The purpose, intentions, and expectations of the parties should be determined 
by considering the contract language and the course of dealing between and conduct of 
the parties. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2 £ 
The duty of good faith and fair dealing requires parties to negotiate omitted terms 
in a contract in good faith. It is a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing for a party to refuse in bad faith to complete negotiations. 
INSTRUCTION NO. z7 
If you find that Mr. Young is contractually entitled to compensation with regard to 
the Krause fee, whether express or implied, you should award Mr. Young an amount 
which represents fair, equitable and reasonable compensation. 
INSTRUCTION NO. J£_ 
You are instructed that the Krause contingent fee (the "Krause fee") in the 
amount of $641,548.38, was paid on behalf of Mr. Krause by a check drawn 
jointly to both Mr. Young and Prince Yeates. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ 
In determining any fact in this case you should not consider nor be 
influenced by any statement made or act done by the court which you may 
interpret as indicating its views thereon. You are the sole and final judges of 
all questions of fact submitted to you, and you must determine such questions 
for yourselves from the evidence, without regard to what you believe the court 
thinks thereon. The court has not intended to express, or intimate, or be 
understood as giving any opinion on what the proof shows or does not show, 
or what are or what are not the facts in the case. And it is immaterial what 
the court thinks thereon. You must follow your own views and not be 
influenced by the views of the court. 
24.CVI 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3D 
The lawyers,like you and myself, are officers of this Court. It is the duty 
of each of them to present the evidence on behalf of the client and to make 
such objections as he or she deems proper and to argue fully the client's cause. 
You should, however, bear in mind that each of the lawyers is here in a 
partisan capacity, and it is both their duty and responsibility to be advocates 
of the position he or she claims for the client. If during the trial or in their 
closing arguments, the lawyers have made statements concerning the evidence 
which do not conform with your recollection of it, you should disregard the 
lawyers' statements and rely solely on your own recollection of the evidence. 
If either lawyer's argument includes statements of the law which differ from 
the law which I have given you, you should disregard such statements and rely 
entirely on the law as given to you by the Court. 
25.CVI 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3 \ 
The court has endeavored to give you instructions embodying all rules 
of law that may become necessary in guiding you to a just and lawful verdict. 
The applicability of some of these instructions will depend upon the 
conclusions you reach as to what the facts are. As to any such instruction, the 
fact that it has been given must not be taken as indicating an opinion of the 
court and that the instruction will be necessary or as to what the facts are. If 
an instruction applies only to a state of facts which you find does not exist, you 
will disregard the instruction. 
26.CVI 
INSTRUCTION NO. 12-
The attitude and conduct of jurors at the outset of their deliberations are 
a matter of considerable importance. It is rarely productive of good for a 
juror, upon entering the jury room, to make an emphatic expression of his 
opinion on the case or to announce a determination to stand for a certain 
verdict. When one does that at the outset, his sense of pride may be aroused, 
and he may hesitate to recede from an announced position if shown that it is 
fallacious. Remember that you are not partisans or advocates in this matter, 
but are judges. The final test of the quality of your service will lie in the 
verdict which you return to the court, not in the opinions any of you may hold 
as you retire. Have in mind that you will make a definite contribution to 
efficient judicial administration if you arrive at a just and proper verdict. To 
that end, the court would remind you that in your deliberations in the jury 
room there can be no triumph excepting the ascertainment and declaration of 
the truth and the administration of justice based thereon. 
27.CVI 
INSTRUCTION NO. ?._? 
It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another and to deliberate 
with a view to reaching an agreement, if your individual judgment allows such 
agreement. You each must decide the case for yourself, but only after 
consideration of the case with your fellow jurors. You should not hesitate to 
change an opinion when convinced that it is wrong. However, you should not 
surrender your honest convictions concerning the effect or weight of evidence 
for the mere purpose of returning a verdict or solely because of the opinion of 
the other jurors. 
28.CVI 
INSTRUCTION NO. ? 4 
The law forbids you to decide any issue in this case by resorting to 
chance. If you decide that a party is entitled to recover, you may then 
determine the amount of damages to be awarded.lt would be unlawful for you 
to agree in advance to take the independent estimate of each juror, then total 
the estimates, draw an average from the total, and to make the average the 
amount of your award. Each of you may express your own independent 
judgment as to what the amount should be. It is your duty to thoughtfully 
consider the amounts suggested, test them in the light of the law and the 
evidence and, after due consideration, determine which, if any, of such 
individual estimates is proper. 
29.CV1 
INSTRUCTION NO. 35"~ 
It is your duty to make findings of fact as to the questions I will submit 
to you. In making your findings of fact, you should bear in mind that the 
burden of proving any disputed fact rests upon the party claiming the fact to 
be true, and that fact must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. 
This is a civil action and six members of the jury may find and return 
a verdict. At least six jurors must agree on the answer to each question, but 
they need not be the same six on each question. As soon as six or more of you 
have agreed on the answer to each question, have the verdict signed and dated 
by your foreperson and then return it to this room. 
30.CVI 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1(e 
Upon retiring to the jury room you will select one of you to act as 
foreperson, who will preside over your deliberations and sign the verdict to 
which you agree. The foreperson should not dominate the jury, but the 
foreperson's opinion should be given the same weight as the opinions of the 
other members of the jury. 
31.CVI 
TabB 
NOV 3 0 2001 
SALT LAKE Q0OWTY 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PRINCE, YEATES & 
GELDZAHLER, a professional 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT S. YOUNG, 
Defendant. 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
CASE NO. 990908360 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
Please answer the following questions from a preponderance of the 
evidence. If you find the evidence preponderates in favor of the issue presented, 
answer "yes." If you find the evidence is so equally balanced that you cannot 
determine a preponderance of the evidence, or if you find that the evidence 
preponderates against the issue presented, answer "no." 
-2-
1. Do you find that Mr. Young was entitled to additional compensation 
as a result of the Krause fee either under his original oral employment contract 
or a valid contract with regard to the helicopter cases? 
ANSWER: Yes_7X. No 
If you answered Question No. 1 "no," you need not answer Question 
No. 2. 
2. What is the fair and reasonable amount of the fee which should be 
paid to Mr. Young? 
$ 
Dated this fd day of November, 2001. 
's^s&^P^y ' 
FOREPERSON 
TabC 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
AFR 2 2 20Q2 
Daniel L. Berman (0304) 
Samuel 0. Gaufin (1170) 
BERMAN GAUFIN TOMSIC & SAVAGE 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801) 328-2200 
Attorneys for Defendant and Counterclaim Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER, a ; 
professional corporation, ] 
Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant, ] 
v.
 t 
ROBERT S. YOUNG, | 
Defendant and Counterclaim Plaintiff. ] 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
i Civil No. 990908360 
I Judge William B. Bohling 
This matter came on regularly for jury trial November 27, 2001 through 
November 30, 2001. The plaintiff and counterclaim defendant Prince, Yeates & 
Geldzahler ("Prince Yeates") was represented by M. David Eckersley, Esq. The 
defendant and counterclaim plaintiff Robert S. Young "(Mr. Young") was represented by 
Samuel O. Gaufin, Esq. The parties made opening statements, presented evidence, 
and made closing arguments. 
Following the instructions of the Court, the jury returned its Special Verdict as 
f O l l O W S : InHnmont , n H OrHpr fl> I 
Deputy Clerk 
ENTERED IN REGISTRY 
OF JUDGMENTS 
JD 
1. Do you find that Mr. Young was entitled to additional 
compensation as a result of the Krause fee either under his original oral 
employment contract or a valid contract with regard to the helicopter 
cases? 
ANSWER: Yes _A_ No 
2. What is the fair and reasonable amount of the fee which 
should be paid to Mr. Young? 
$280,000 
Subsequently, the Court received: Mr. Young's proposed form of Judgment; 
Plaintiff's Objection to Proposed Judgment; Plaintiffs Motion for Stay of Execution 
Pending Appeal, For Alternative Security, and For Disbursement of Funds; and Mr. 
Young's Motion for Attorney Fees and Expenses. 
On April 1, 2002, the foregoing post-trial matters all came on regularly for 
hearing before the Court. At this hearing, Prince Yeates was again represented by Mr. 
David Eckersley, Esq. Mr. Young was again represented by Samuel O. Gaufin. 
Argument was heard, following which the Court, being fully advised, ruled upon the 
posWrial matters and directed that this Judgment and Order be prepared reflecting the 
Judgment and the Court's post-trial rulings. 
Now, in accordance with the jury verdict and the Court's post-trial rulings, the 
Court enters this Judgment and Order as follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Mr. Young shall have judgment against Prince Yeates in the sum of 
$280,000. 
2 
2. Mr. Young shall furtbgr have judgment against Prince, Yeates for his costs 
in the sum of $ 
3. The judgments awarded in paragraphs 1 and 2 hereof shall bear post-
judgment interest at the statutory rate for judgments. 
4. The Court rules that Mr. Young's claims for compensation were 
unliquidated, rules that Mr. Young is not entitled to any prejudgment interest, and 
sustains Prince Yeates' Objection to the award of prejudgment interest. 
5. With regard to Plaintiff's Motion for Stay of Execution Pending Appeal, For 
Alternative Security, and For Disbursement of Funds and that aspect of Plaintiffs 
Objection to Proposed Judgment relating thereto, the Court rules that: the funds 
deposited with Fidelity Investment pursuant to this Court's Order, dated August 31, 
1999, shall remain on deposit pending appeal and further order; no distribution of the 
funds deposited with Fidelity Investment shall be made either to Mr. Young or Prince 
Yeates pending appeal and further order; and execution by Mr. Young on the 
judgments awarded in paragraphs 1 and 2 hereof shall be stayed pending appeal and 
further order. 
6. The Court rules that Mr. Young is not entitled to attorney fees under the 
rationale of Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828 (Utah 1992) and denies Mr. Young's 
Motion for Attorney Fees and Expenses. 
3 
DATED: April 2^r2002. 
BY THE COURT: 
*Ul\ 
Judge William B. Pohljng 
District Court Judge ~~"~:7 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
M. David Eckersley, 
City Centre I, Suite 9( 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Counterclaim Defendant 
BERMAN, GAUFIN, TOMSIC & SAVAGE 
Samuel ONSaufin 
50 South Main, Suite 1250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Counterclaim Plaintiff 
4 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the / / day of October, 2002 I caused two copies 
of BRIEF OF APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT to be mailed, postage 
prepaid, to: 
M. David Eckersley. Esq. 
Prince. Yeates & Geldzhaler 
City Centre I, Suite 900 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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